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Language may be one of most important attributes which separates humans from
other animal species. It has been suggested by some commentators that the primary
biological function of human language is to deceive and selfishly manipulate social
competitors. However, despite the existence of a large body of relevant theoretical and
empirical literature in favor of the social bonding hypothesis for language function, the
ostensible evidence and arguments for the deception hypothesis have not been fully
discussed. The following review analyses the evidence and theoretical arguments from
human social behavior, comparative animal behavior, and developmental psychology
and suggests that deception shows clear signs of a derived function for language.
Furthermore, in addition to being used relatively infrequently across most human and
non-human animal contexts, deception appears to be utilized just as often for prosocial
and social bonding functions, as it is for antisocial purposes. Future studies should
focus on theoretical and experimental investigations which explore interactions between
deceptive and honest language use in the context of social bonding.
Keywords: spoken language, language evolution, language origins, direct and derived functions, vocal behavior,
deception, manipulation
INTRODUCTION
Language may be the single most important feature which differentiates humans from other animal
species (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Fitch, 2010). Although, many non-human animals have
evolved the ability to communicate (Searcy and Nowicki, 2005; Bradbury and Vehrencamp, 2011),
no other organisms aside from humans can take a finite number of components – more than 10,000
words for the typical adult language user (Goulden et al., 1990; D’Anna et al., 1991; Zechmeister
et al., 1995; Treffers-Daller and Milton, 2013) – and link them together into a vast array of potential
combinations, all of which hold distinct meanings (Pinker, 1997). Moreover, language may be
integral in supplementing humans’ ability to engage in advanced forms of social cognition and
understanding others’ intentions, including capacities such as Theory of Mind and higher-order
intentionality (Dunbar, 1998, 2009; Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007).
Many biological functions for language have been postulated, including cultural learning
(Pinker and Bloom, 1990), social bonding (Dunbar, 2004), and deception (Scott-Phillips, 2006).
In most cases, such proposals often stress the importance of one primary functional candidate,
and occasionally posit other purposes as additional secondary uses for language (De Backer
and Gurven, 2006; Galantucci and Roberts, 2014). In the context of language evolution, this
distinction is often referred to as the difference between direct and derived functions (Millikan,
1984; Origgi and Sperber, 2000). Further, despite the existence of a large body of relevant
theoretical and empirical research in favor of the social bonding hypothesis as a direct function,
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(Dunbar, 1993, 2003, 2004; Nettle and Dunbar, 1997; McComb
and Semple, 2005; Mesoudi et al., 2006; Roberts, 2010, 2013;
Ireland et al., 2011; Weaver and Bosson, 2011; Cohen, 2012;
Freeberg et al., 2012; Laidre et al., 2012; Dávid-Barrett and
Dunbar, 2013; Redhead and Dunbar, 2013; Galantucci and
Roberts, 2014; Pietraszewski and Schwartz, 2014), there is
nonetheless still considerable debate over the issue as to how
and why language originated exclusively in the human species
(Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Számadó and Szathmáry, 2006;
Larson et al., 2010).
Impressed with the apparent ubiquity of deception found
throughout the animal kingdom, some have argued that most
animal communication systems have evolved primarily (as
opposed to secondarily as a derived function) for the function of
deception (Dawkins and Krebs, 1978; Krebs and Dawkins, 1984;
Scott-Phillips, 2006). According to this hypothesis, the speaker
(or signaller) may benefit from the breakdown of the normative
relationship between speaker attribute or referent and the actual
nature of the external world, while the listener (or receiver) may
incur a significant cost from this misrepresentation (Searcy and
Nowicki, 2005). For instance, in a classic series of articles by
Dawkins and Krebs (1978) and Krebs and Dawkins (1984), it was
argued that animal signaling and by extension human language,
ought to be viewed as an evolutionary arms race in which
signallers evolve to become better at manipulating receivers,
while receivers evolve to become more resistant to manipulation.
Granted, although manipulation can in principle be thought of
in cooperative terms, and need not always imply competition,
this particular conceptualization is apparently intended to refer
fundamentally to adversarial relationships (Dawkins and Krebs,
1978; Krebs and Dawkins, 1984). According to this perspective,
animal communication is defined solely in terms of the way
in which signaling generates functional consequences primarily
for the signaller: “communication is said to occur when an
animal, the actor, does something to influence the sense organs
of another animal, the reactor, so that the reactor’s behavior
changes to the advantage of the actor” (Dawkins and Krebs,
1978, p. 283). Additionally, at least one evolutionary linguist
has voiced a very similar assertion, in that human language
evolved primarily for the function of selfish signaller mind-
reading and manipulation (Scott-Phillips, 2006). According to
this hypothesis, human language is viewed as a fundamentally
deceptive method of communication.
However, currently available evidence suggests language more
likely directly evolved for social bonding functions, while
secondarily derived for other purposes (De Backer and Gurven,
2006; Galantucci and Roberts, 2014), including deception. To this
end, the following review analyses available evidence from human
social behavior, comparative animal behavior, and developmental
psychology which point to the relative paucity and rareness of
deception found in these relevant contexts. Further, as language
is a behavior and does not fossilize, speculative accounts that
invoke archeological claims as evidence, as is often done by
many theorists (Számadó, 2010; Bickerton and Szathmáry, 2011),
will be avoided. Ultimately, a careful and thorough analysis of
language and animal communication, when used for deceptive
purposes, in fact reveals substantially more evidence in favor
of social bonding as the primary function of language, while
suggesting a derived function for deception.
For present purposes, deception is defined here as the
phenomenon where a signaller benefits from the breakdown
of the normative correlation between signaller characteristic
and external attribute (Searcy and Nowicki, 2005). In more
colloquial terms, deception has been defined elsewhere as “the
projection, to one’s own advantage, of an inaccurate or false
image of knowledge, intentions, or motivations” (deWaal, 2005,
p. 86). For purposes of clarification and consistency, language is
further defined here as the uniquely human biological capacity
for complex vocal imitation – the ability to imitate complex
multisyllabic vocalizations – including the cognitive, anatomical,
physiological, and genetic systems that underpin human speech
(Fitch, 2010).
EVIDENCE FOR DECEPTION AS A
DERIVED FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE
Comparative Animal Behavior
The evolutionary strategy of deception, once thought unique to
humans, has now been documented in a relatively small number
of non-human primate species (Whiten and Byrne, 1988a; Byrne
and Whiten, 1990; deWaal, 2005), including chimpanzees (Hare
et al., 2006; Slocombe and Zuberbühler, 2007), baboons (Byrne
and Whiten, 1985), rhesus (Gouzoules et al., 1996), macaque
(Overduin-de Vries et al., 2015) and tufted capuchin monkeys
(Wheeler, 2009), as well as birds (Munn, 1986; Møller, 1988, 1990;
Tramer, 1994; Bugnyarf and Kotrschal, 2002; Igic et al., 2015),
ungulates (Bro-Jørgensen and Pangle, 2010), foxes (Rüppell,
1986) and squirrels (Tamura, 1995; but see Cheney and Seyfarth,
1990 for an alternative account of deception in a greater variety
of non-human primates). Chimpanzees, for instance, have been
observed using deceptive non-verbal signals in the wild, as well as
deceitful sign-language mimicry in trained conditions (Byrne and
Whiten, 1990; deWaal, 2005; Kirkpatrick, 2007). This particular
form of deceit, or tactical deception, is typically observed as the
concealment of a thing, behavior or an emotion (Whiten and
Byrne, 1988b; Byrne and Whiten, 1990; Hauser, 1997; Whiten,
1997). For example, in one well-documented case, a chimpanzee
was approached from the rear by a noisily heard aggressive
challenger: to conceal his fearful expression, the chimpanzee
affected his lips and face in such a way as to rid himself of the fear
grin, before turning to face his competitor (deWaal, 1986, p. 233;
Byrne and Whiten, 1991, p. 134).
Further, there are even fewer cases of animal communication
which might be aptly characterized as this sort of manipulative
tactical deception, often referred to as functional deception, which
more commonly occurs in humans (Byrne and Whiten, 1990;
Talwar and Lee, 2008). Indeed, in highlighting the relatively
paucity found throughout the animal kingdom, Byrne and
Whiten (1990, p. 3) define tactical deception accordingly as “acts
from the normal repertoire of [an] agent, deployed such that
another individual is likely to misinterpret what the acts signify,
to the advantage of the agent [italics added].” As such, this sort
of deception can prove potentially costly to the user, as tactical
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deception mostly occurs in social animals, which may lose trust
of fellow group-members when their deceit is discovered (Smith,
1986; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; deWaal, 2005).
In the vast majority of documented cases, tactical deception
most frequently occurs in cases where alarm calls or warning
cries are used deceptively to obtain access to increased food
supplies or reproductive opportunities (Byrne and Whiten, 1985;
Munn, 1986; Rüppell, 1986; Møller, 1988, 1990; Tramer, 1994;
Tamura, 1995; Bugnyarf and Kotrschal, 2002; Bro-Jørgensen and
Pangle, 2010). For instance, male topi antelopes have been found
to alarm snort deceptively in order to retain receptive females
within the dominant males’ territory, precluding them from
straying too far from the group (Bro-Jørgensen and Pangle, 2010).
Among primates, subordinate tufted capuchin monkeys have
been found to deceptively use alarm calls (normally reserved
for predator sightings) to evoke a response from other members
of the group when competing with dominant monkeys over
valuable food resources (in effect, taking advantage of the
distraction and fleeing the scene in order to steal food; Wheeler,
2009). Similar findings have been reported in Amazonian birds,
including the white-winged shrike tanager and the bluish-
slate antshrike (Munn, 1986). In addition, observations of wild
geladas have found that monkeys involved in surreptitious
extra-pair copulations were actually less inclined to vocalize
and more inclined to copulate when the cuckolded male
was in distant proximity, as vocal deceivers typically receive
significantly more physical aggression than non-vocal deceivers
(le Roux et al., 2013). Similar acts of apparent punishment
and aggression have been observed in rhesus monkeys who fail
to vocalize their discovery of food to the rest of the group
(Hauser, 1992; although see Jensen, 2010 for an alternative
perspective).
Nonetheless, considerable evidence shows deception, at
least in chimpanzees, more often occurs through non-vocal
expression, gesture, and various body postures, indicating vocal
communication is not always a necessary or even favored
requirement (deWaal, 2005). Moreover, because the costs of
deception are believed to be relatively high for the deceiver
if discovered, tactical deception has thus far been documented
in very few cases; as such, it is believed to be more common
in cases where the costs of neglecting the possibly deceptive
act are even higher than the costs of believing (e.g., ignoring
the call which could potentially result in death by predation;
Hauser, 1992; Wheeler, 2009). In summary, currently available
evidence indicates, particularly in social group-living animals
where trust is often important, the scarcity, potential risk, and
highly context-sensitive nature of most acts of deception within
animal communication (Smith, 1986; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990;
deWaal, 2005).
Developmental Psychology
Further suggestions for a derived function for human deception
have come from child development studies. For example,
experimental studies examining children’s antisocial deception
(i.e., lying to hurt or disbenefit someone) have found that self-
serving lies (e.g., to conceal a transgression), typically occur
between 4 and 7 years of age, with lies below this age range
occurring much more infrequently, where the default seems
to be honesty (Talwar and Lee, 2008; Lee, 2013). Nonetheless,
while children seem, in most cases, more willing to lie for
familiar others than strangers, self-interest seems to be a
generally stronger motivator for deception (Talwar and Lee,
2008).
On the other hand, while non-human primates have been
observed using tactical deception for self-interest, prosocial
deception (i.e., lying to protect someone, or to benefit or help
others), appears to be unique to humans (Talwar and Lee, 2008).
In fact, studies have shown that older children beyond age 7
are generally more inclined to tell prosocial ‘white lies’ (i.e.,
lies intended to spare the feelings of the person being lied to),
despite potential costs to themselves (Talwar and Lee, 2008; Lee,
2013). For example, in one noteworthy study, children were
instructed to take the photo of a confederate experimenter with
an unattractive mark on their face. In most cases, when the
experimenter queried: “Do I look okay for the photo?,” the
children lied, telling the experimenter that they looked fine,
while later confiding to someone else that they actually didn’t
look okay (Talwar and Lee, 2002). Moreover, as children grow
older, they become more likely to be concerned with the feelings
and needs of others, and therefore more likely to tell prosocial
white lies, as well as prosocial ‘blue lies’ (i.e., lies intended
to benefit an in-group collective; Talwar and Lee, 2008; Lee,
2013). For instance, in one study of blue lies, children were
embedded in a context in which their class brazenly opted to
break the rules when choosing team members to represent their
class in a school district competition; when later questioned,
the students tended to lie in order to conceal their deceptive
transgressions (Fu et al., 2008). Therefore, although children
are generally more inclined to tell lies for self-interest as they
grow older, they will more often conform to social norms
and etiquette in telling prosocial lies in order to maintain
social relationships, when costs to self-interest are relatively
low (Talwar and Lee, 2008; Lee, 2013). Accordingly, it would
appear lying, in addition to being relatively infrequent, is perhaps
ironically just as often used for prosocial and social bonding
functions, as it is for antisocial deception (Talwar and Lee,
2008).
In addition, further reasons have been presented which argue
in favor of a derived function for linguistic deception (Talwar
and Lee, 2008). First, it may be unreasonable to assume, at
least for antisocial deception, whether lying is especially well-
suited to serve the primary adaptive function in children, given
their general lack of physical strength and social power (Talwar
and Lee, 2008). Second, deception is typically very context-
specific; in some situations, lying may be appropriate, but
in others honesty is generally a more ideal strategy (Talwar
and Lee, 2008; Lee, 2013). Third, with respect to potential
adaptive functions for language, considerable evidence shows
deception often occurs through non-verbal expressive control
in a variety of deceptive situations, demonstrating language is
not always a necessary requirement (Talwar and Lee, 2008; Lee,
2013).
Nevertheless, some have suggested a harsh disciplinarian
approach to parenting may be directly related to the development
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of deception in children (e.g., in order to conceal transgressions),
as an adaptive response to avoiding severe punishment (Talwar
and Lee, 2008). However, given lying typically occurs in
many varieties, including antisocial and prosocial lying (e.g.,
white and blue lies) with prosocial lying occurring later in
development, it seems a social bonding function could as
legitimately be posited for many uses of deceptive language, as
an antisocial function (Talwar and Lee, 2008). Indeed, several
studies have shown an increase in antisocial lying in children
and adolescents with significant behavioral problems, suggesting
a lack of normative development in these cases (Li et al.,
2011; Lee, 2013). In summary, studies from developmental
psychology similarly indicate an underlying rarity, tendency
toward prosociality, and context-sensitive aspect of most cases of
lying and deception.
Human Social Behavior
Studies of human social behavior have further shown that
deception is a relatively infrequent occurrence in everyday adult
social interactions (Hancock et al., 2004; Serota et al., 2010).
For instance, in a sample taken of over a 1000 United States
citizens, the mean number of lies told on an average day for
a typical individual was less than two (Serota et al., 2010).
In addition, the statistical distribution of the population was
highly skewed. Of the total lies spoken, 23% were told by
one percent of the sample and 50% were told by a mere five
percent of individuals tallied. Experiments conducted under
controlled laboratory conditions have uncovered very similar
findings (Abeler et al., 2012). In fact, analysis of typical
human conversational content reveals social relationship topics
dominate over two-thirds of total daily conversation time
(Haviland, 1991; Dunbar et al., 1997). As in any biological system
that has significant time and energetic costs as well as adaptive
benefits (Barrett et al., 2002), this certainly begs the question as to
why we spend most of our time in the prosocial use of language,
if language reputedly evolved primarily for manipulation and
deception.
Nonetheless, given so many apparent benefits of deception,
often in the interest of manipulating competitors (Dawkins and
Krebs, 1978; Byrne and Whiten, 1990; Hauser, 1992), many
examining the evolution of language have queried how language
remains predominantly honest in the average daily use of
language (Knight, 1998; Nettle, 1999; Fitch, 2010). A plausible
explanation, suggested by several authors, concerns the potential
threat of inauspicious social reputation (Silk et al., 2000; Donath,
2008), in the best case, or implementation of strict social
sanctions against deception, in the worst case (Clutton-Brock
and Parker, 1995; Lachmann et al., 2001; Bliege Bird and
Smith, 2005). Preliminary support for this proposal suggests
this may in fact be in the case. For example, a study of
American dating over the Internet found that approximately
90% of males and 75% of females were dishonest about at
least one physical characteristic in their online personal ads;
males were inclined to claim greater height, females lesser
weight (Toma et al., 2008). Discrepancies from fact were
generally quite small in magnitude, however, suggesting that
people were at least partially aware of the potential social
repercussions of being identified as deceitful (Toma et al.,
2008).
Finally, computational modeling experiments of human social
networks demonstrate that deception can be used just as
often for prosocial as for antisocial functions (Iñiguez et al.,
2014; Barrio et al., 2016). For instance, one study showed
that antisocial lies cause networks to become increasingly
disrupted, whereas prosocial ‘white’ lies can be beneficial
in smoothing the flow of complex social interactions and
facilitating larger, more integrated networks (Iñiguez et al., 2014).
Moreover, these results further suggest that the capacity to
lie in moderation likely emerged after language had already
come into existence, as the impact of lying is probably too
destructive of social bonding and community solidarity to
allow its exclusive evolution (Iñiguez et al., 2014; Barrio et al.,
2016). In summary, studies of human social behavior further
suggest that instances of dishonest language use are relatively
rare, with a more common tendency toward prosociality and
context-dependence as the basis for most acts of lying and
deception.
DISCUSSION
Unraveling a comprehensive understanding for language
function and evolution is unlikely to be a simple or
straightforward process. More plausibly, fully developed modern
language is likely to be the result of many different selective
processes acting in sequence or aggregation. For instance, given
a sufficient opportunistic window, sexual selection in particular
often embellishes traits originally provided by more conventional
processes of natural selection. Indeed, the stratification of several
different selection processes is not unusual in evolutionary
biology. Nevertheless, thorough review of the utility of deceptive
communication in non-human animal societies, deceptive
language use during childhood development, and adult use
of deceptive language in human social life suggests a derived
function of language for deception. In summary, this analysis
suggests a direct functional role for language is most likely
to have been associated with social bonding, with occasional
outlets for derived uses of deception in context-specific social
environments.
A potential objection to the conclusions found here is that
language is unlikely to have evolved for a single primary function,
as language is so clearly useful for so many different aspects
of human social life. Certainly, it is undeniable that language
can be pivotal for many different purposes, but usefulness
does not equate to a selective pressure or an evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS). The current article in fact maintains that
language likely evolved directly for social bonding (Dunbar,
2003, 2004; Roberts, 2010, 2013; Freeberg et al., 2012; Dávid-
Barrett and Dunbar, 2013) and secondarily derived for several
other functions (De Backer and Gurven, 2006; Galantucci and
Roberts, 2014), among them including deception. Indeed, it is
a truism within non-human animal communication research
that most forms of vocal learning likely originated and evolved
for one or at most a few primary selective functions, but not
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for every conceivable function (Nowicki and Searcy, 2014).
Therefore, consistent with conventional evolutionary theory, the
claim that language evolved for all functions is both unfalsifiable
and biologically improbable. More importantly, however, of the
evidence reviewed here, there is very little data to support this
claim.
In addition, apart from the extensive experimental data
reviewed here in support of deception as a derived function
for language, there are additional theoretical reasons which
reinforce this conclusion. Indeed, while deception accurately
characterizes specific kinds of animal signaling in particular
contexts, there are compelling reasons to question whether it
can be distinguished as the primary function for the greater
part of biological communication systems, including human
language. Namely, behavioral ecologists have argued theoretically
that Dawkins and Krebs (1978) and Krebs and Dawkins
(1984) signal evolution models (which argue that signallers
evolve to manipulate receivers, while receivers evolve to resist
manipulation) are in fact gravely problematic; if there is, on
average, no beneficial information to the receiver of a signal, then
receivers should evolve to discount the signal (then signaling
ultimately has no benefit to the signaller and the system of
communication disintegrates; Searcy and Nowicki, 2005, p. 8).
Granted, an incomplete theoretical explanation to this puzzle
was suggested by Zahavi (1975), albeit confined primarily to mate
choice or aggressive signaling contexts. More specifically, while
males may be disposed to manipulate or deceive females or other
male competitors with respect to their biological fitness, these
males are actually ‘handicapped,’ thereby confirming the honesty
of the signal (Searcy and Nowicki, 2005, p. 9). The prototypical
example often given is the large tail of peacocks, as the peacock
pays a cost as an assurance of its honesty: only those peacocks
of adequately high health, vitality, vigor and quality can afford
the most exuberant, burdensome tails in the face of continuous
predation (Zahavi, 1975; Grafen, 1990; Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997).
Clearly, then such models seem to apply only in a relatively
limited number of contexts, and it is further uncertain as to
whether these animal models can be indiscriminately applied to
human language. Therefore, functionally deceptive signaling is
believed to be uncommon, as well as have a generally low cost
for the misled; otherwise, the signal would simply be ignored
and over time become ineffectual (Fitch and Hauser, 2002;
Searcy and Nowicki, 2005). Finally, even strong advocates of this
proposal have conceded that prosocial communication is likely
to be favored in social interactions requiring trust where group
members frequently interact over a long-term basis (Krebs and
Dawkins, 1984), as is characteristic of humans and most non-
human primates (deWaal, 2005). In other words, lying is only
an effective strategy when individuals have reasonable confidence
they are ordinarily being told the truth; that is, where previous
relationships of social bonding and trust have been built based on
language already in place.
CONCLUSION
Despite a steadily increasing amount of evidence that language
evolved primarily for facilitating social bonding in large and
complex social groups (Dunbar, 1993, 2003, 2004; Nettle and
Dunbar, 1997; McComb and Semple, 2005; Mesoudi et al.,
2006; Roberts, 2010, 2013; Ireland et al., 2011; Weaver and
Bosson, 2011; Cohen, 2012; Freeberg et al., 2012; Laidre et al.,
2012; Dávid-Barrett and Dunbar, 2013; Redhead and Dunbar,
2013; Galantucci and Roberts, 2014; Pietraszewski and Schwartz,
2014), there is currently no broad consensus as to how language
originated in the human species (Számadó and Szathmáry, 2006;
Fitch, 2010). Despite the fact that upon closer examination,
the deceptive use of language reveals a more direct role for
social bonding, and suggests a derived role for deception,
there are nevertheless several adherents to the perspective that
the primary function for language is deception (Dawkins and
Krebs, 1978; Krebs and Dawkins, 1984; Scott-Phillips, 2006). On
the contrary, it is likely that some combination of deceptive
and honest communication led to the social bonding and
mediation effects of language, although the relationship and
interplay between the two strategies remains to be thoroughly
investigated. Moreover, language probably serves several other
important secondary functions (Millikan, 1984; Origgi and
Sperber, 2000), among them cultural transmission, pedagogy,
cooperation, and sexual advertisement, as well as deception
(Számadó and Szathmáry, 2006). Future studies should focus on
further theoretical and experimental work which explores how
these more subordinate functions interact within the context of
social bonding.
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